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Leo S. Jones spent four months in jail, accused of a probation
violation when his probation had long since expired. His
incarceration was illegal. It was also preventable.
In this article, I describe the unique data collection project that
identified Mr. Jones's case. Then, I analyze the various individual,
institutional, and systemic practices that contributed to Mr. Jones's
illegal incarceration. I show how an investigation of Mr. Jones's
case led to the discovery of widespread latent errors that may have
adversely affected innumerable other detainees. I conclude by
explaining what this case reveals about how data collection and
analysis can improve public defender practice.
II. THE KATRINA-GIDEON INTERVIEW PROJECT
In August of 2005, Hurricane Katrina made landfall. The
Orleans Parish Prison evacuated thousands of pretrial prisoners to
jails across the state. In. the weeks and months after the storm,
New Orleans police arrested thousands more. With the Orleans
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Parish Prison still closed, these new arrestees joined the
languishing Katrina prisoners in remote parish jails and large state
prisons. Meanwhile, the Orleans Indigent Defender Board (OIDB)
collapsed, leaving thousands of unrepresented "Katrina prisoners"
in jails across the state.'
By December of 2006, indigent defendants were represented by a
newly funded, client-centered public defender's office (Orleans
Public Defenders or OPD). Yet, by conservative estimates,
hundreds of "Katrina prisoners" had had cases pending since before
the storm made landfall. Most had never met with an attorney.
Most of their new attorneys lacked basic case information, such as
charging documents and police reports. With new arrests occurring
every day, OPD was unable to address this backlog of criminal
cases.
In response to this constitutional crisis, OPD, the Tulane
Criminal Law Clinic (the Clinic), and the Student Hurricane
Network (SHN) launched the Katrina-Gideon Interview Project
(KGIP), an ambitious defender-assistance project. KGIP's primary
goal was to interview the pre-Katrina prisoners and to create case
files for their assigned public defenders. Secondarily, KGIP sought
to assess the legal needs of post-Katrina arrestees who had spent an
extended period in jail without counsel or court appearance.
A. Criminal Justice Stakeholders as Wary "Limited Partners"
KGIP's viability depended upon two key factors that were beyond
OPD's control. First, students needed access to defendants. That
access depended on the willingness of the jailers-the Sheriff and
the Department of Corrections-to allow hundreds of students to
enter the jail to conduct dozens of inmate interviews over a four
week period. Second, students needed information about the
defendants. Since the old public defender's office lacked any
practice of creating and keeping case files, OPD and KGIP were
1 For a description of Katrina's impact on New Orleans's public defender system, see
Chiarkis, N. L., Henry, D. A., & Stone, R. N. (2006). An assessment of the immediate and
longer-term needs of the New Orleans public defender system. Washington, DC: American
University. Retrieved from http://lpdb.1a.gov/Serving%2OThe%2OPublic[Reports/txtfiles/pdflA
n%20Assessment%2Oof/o20the%2OImmediate%20and%20Longer%2OTerm%2Needs%20of%
20the%200rleans%2OPublic%2ODefense%20System.pdf. For narratives of the city's post-
Katrina criminal justice collapse and reform, see Vance, S. S. (2008). Justice after disaster-
What Hurricane Katrina did to the justice system in New Orleans, Howard Law Journal, 51,
621-649; Metzger, P. R. (2007). Doing Katrina time, Tulane Law Review, 81, 1175-1217;
Garrett, B. L., & Tetlow, T. (2006). Criminal justice collapse: The Constitution after
Hurricane Katrina, Duke Law Journal, 56, 127-178.
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unable to assemble even rudimentary facsimiles of files. 2 KGIP
lacked the resources to locate and print publicly available docket
information. KGIP was unable to pay for police reports ($25 each)
and had no access to any discovery that might have been provided
before Katrina. Cooperation with the district attorney's office and
the local bar would be essential to KGIP's construction of
meaningful case files.
However, KGIP's interests were not entirely aligned with those of
other criminal justice stakeholders. OPD had a different set of
priorities than the district attorney, the Orleans Parish Criminal
Sheriffs Office (the Sheriff) and the Department of Corrections
(DOC). And, as the project's director, I had a particularly
challenging relationship with some of these stakeholders. I had
been a vocal critic of the district attorney's office and had sued the
sheriffs office over its failure to comply with judicial orders for
prisoner release. I was on better terms with the Department of
Corrections-DOC administrators and staff had been
extraordinarily helpful in locating "lost" prisoners and identifying
prisoners who were detained past the expiration of their sentences.
Still, DOC was technically on the "opposite side" of my work as a
criminal defense attorney. KGIP's success, therefore, would turn
upon our ability to develop cooperative relationships with our
institutional adversaries.
In the wake of Hurricane Katrina, the Louisiana Supreme Court
had created a Southeast Louisiana Criminal Justice Recovery Task
Force. That task force met regularly to explore cooperative
possibilities for responding to the post-Katrina criminal justice
crisis. After previewing the nascent KGIP concept with the court, I
brought the KGIP proposal to the task force. There, I sought-and
received-help from the district attorney's office, the Sheriff, and
DOC. That cooperation, however, was not easily obtained.
The Sheriff and DOC had two significant institutional concerns
about KGIP. First, by interviewing more than 300 inmates in less
than four weeks, KGIP would place extraordinary demands upon
local and statewide correctional systems-systems that had already
been stretched far beyond their ordinary capacities. Law
enforcement would have to prescreen each volunteer. Each jail
would have to reserve multiple interview facilities. Correctional
2 See Chiarkis, N. L., Henry, D. A., & Stone, R. N. (2006). An assessment of the immediate




staff would have to transport dozens of inmates to and from
interview rooms according to a rigorous interview schedule. The
interview process might conflict with the facility operations,
interrupt inmate activities, or require additional security. The
interviews might prove disruptive, "riling" inmates, stirring
discontent about interminable post-Katrina delays, or raising
worries about loved ones left behind in the storm.
To minimize KGIP's administrative burdens, we agreed to provide
DOC with advance copies of a "KGIP clearance list." That list
would include each student's name, date of birth, address, and
social security number. DOC would "clear" each volunteer or
identify the volunteer as "ineligible" to enter correctional facilities.
(Ultimately, only two volunteers were excluded.) In addition, KGIP
agreed to a standardized interview schedule: interviews would occur
twice daily, at 10:00 a.m. and 2:00 p.m. KGIP would provide DOC
and the Sheriff with a detailed schedule for each day of interviews
at each facility. The schedule would include each interviewee's
name, each volunteer's name, the proposed time and date of each
interview, and a list of any special requirements, such as additional
clearance for an interpreter.
Having resolved these logistics, we still had to address the Sheriff
and DOC's public relations and litigation concerns. The Sheriffs
failure to timely evacuate the Orleans Parish Prison (OPP) had
been the subject of widespread negative publicity. As described in
the American Civil Liberties Union's 2006 report, Abandoned &
Abused:
[T]housands of men, women, and children were abandoned
at OPP. As floodwaters rose in the OPP buildings, power
was lost, and entire buildings were plunged into darkness.
Deputies left their posts wholesale, leaving behind prisoners
in locked cells, some standing in sewage-tainted water up to
their chests. . . . [Without food, water, or ventilation,
prisoners broke windows in order to get air and carved holes
in the jail's walls in an effort to get to safety. Some prisoners
leapt into the water, while others made signs or set fire to
bed sheets and pieces of clothing to signal to rescuers. 3
After the prisoners were rescued, the DOC worked with sheriffs
3 American Civil Liberties Union. (2006). Abandoned and abused: Executive summary and
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around the state to place inmates in any available facility, from
local jails to maximum security prisons. Social activists and
national media issued widespread criticism of the resulting prison
conditions:
At the Elayn Hunt Correctional Center, thousands of OPP
evacuees spent several days on a large outdoor field, where
prisoner-on-prisoner violence was rampant and went
unchecked by correctional officers. From there, prisoners
went to other facilities, where some were subjected to
systematic abuse and racially motivated assaults by prison
guards.4
Naturally, the Sheriff and DOC were worried that KGIP might
generate similarly adverse publicity and provide fuel for lawsuits
over prison conditions.
So, as a condition of access to the prisoners, the Sheriff and DOC
required us to limit KGIP's scope: (1) KGIP's sole mission would be
to help OPD develop case files for the Katrina prisoners, and (2)
KGIP would not assist any inmate in a claim relating to prison
conditions.5 KGIP agreed not to pursue any civil or administrative
complaints about jail conditions. KGIP also required each volunteer
to sign an agreement prohibiting her from making any public
statement about the project. To build trust around these issues,
KGIP allowed the Sheriff and DOC to review and approve KGIP's
standardized interview template. Finally, each volunteer
acknowledged that, upon any breach of these terms, KGIP would
report the breaching volunteer to the appropriate disciplinary
authority.
To conduct meaningful interviews and to create useful case files,
KGIP needed copies of the most basic documents: arrest warrants,
bills of information, police reports, and discovery. However, the
public defender's office had not, in the past, retained copies of these
documents. Rather, OIPD attorneys gave these court papers to the
client; OIDP had no client files and, therefore, had no place to store
these legal documents. As a result, the district attorney's office had
to duplicate its own work, providing KGIP with copies of police
reports and discovery that had already been provided to the clients'
previous attorneys.
4 American Civil Liberties Union. (2006). Abandoned and abused: Executive summary and
recommendations. New York, NY: American Civil Liberties Union.
5 A copy of this agreement is on file with the author.
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B. Law School and Law Firm Support
Beginning in November of 2006, SHN funded a full-time project
coordinator who worked with student and law firm volunteers to
create KGIP files and a list of KGIP detainees and their locations.
The project required students to locate attorney supervisors to
accompany them at an eight to one student-supervisor ratio. SHN
recruited law students from across the country to spend one week of
their winter breaks working with KGIP.
During the earliest weeks of interviews, OPD did not have
electricity or furniture. Tulane Law School was too far away from
the jail to be practical and had too few printing resources. Internet
access was spotty, at best, throughout the city. Local law firms
stepped into the breach. Law firms volunteered to create case files
for the interviewees. Lawyers, paralegals, and administrative
assistants downloaded and printed docket information from the
Sheriffs online database. When limited workspace and minimal
computer access posed significant challenges, law firms opened
their doors to the volunteers.
Because of this unprecedented cooperation between government,
private law firms, and student volunteers, nearly 300 KGIP law
students and supervisors. interviewed hundreds of incarcerated
public defender clients and created cases files for their beleaguered
attorneys.
C. Project Protocols
Upon their arrival in New Orleans, volunteers participated in a
full day of training. They were then assigned to teams on a facility-
by-facility basis. Some teams conducted interviews in Orleans
Parish. Others traveled hundreds of miles to interview inmates in
the most remote rural locations.
During the days, the volunteers met with inmates. They
conducted their interviews following a standardized template
designed to capture both statistical data about the interviewee
population and narrative data about individual defendant's
experiences. In the evenings, students worked with their
supervisors to convert their interview templates into file
memoranda. Once a supervisor signed off on a memorandum, a
student uploaded the interview form and the memorandum into the
KGIP database; hardcopies were placed in the OPD client files. No
volunteer was allowed to start on another detainee interview until
she had completed any outstanding interview memoranda.
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III. MR. JONES'S ILLEGAL INCARCERATION
In September of 2006, the Orleans Parish Criminal Sheriffs
Office arrested Mr. Jones on a probation violation warrant. On
December 14, 2006, Sean Zehtab, a second-year law student at the
University of Nebraska, drove a thousand miles-from Lincoln,
Nebraska, to New Orleans, Louisiana-to volunteer with KGIP.
Less than forty-eight hours later, Zehtab traveled another 250 miles
to the Winn Correctional Center in Winfield, Louisiana, to interview
several Katrina prisoners, including Leo Jones.
In his interview, Mr. Jones explained, "I don't know why I'm in
here. I had a probation but it expired." In almost four months, Mr.
Jones had not seen an attorney or appeared in court. Mr. Jones's
docket sheet did not contain any reference to his current
incarceration. His presence in the prison was a mystery-to us and
to him. A call to the sheriffs office solved that mystery, but created
new ones.
The Louisiana Criminal Code requires the sheriffs office to
promptly notify the trial court and the probation department
whenever it takes custody of a person arrested on a probation
violation warrant. It also requires that, within 10 days, the court
determine whether there is probable cause to support the probation
violation allegations. 6 Mr. Jones was arrested on a probation
violation warrant. However, the sheriffs office failed to notify
either the court or the probation officer of his arrest. Since no other
criminal justice stakeholder knew that Mr. Jones was in jail, there
was no one to alert the court or demand a hearing.
Once we knew why Mr. Jones had been detained, we returned to
a review of the docket in case. What we saw shocked us.
On April 1, 2003, the court had sentenced Mr. Jones to two years
of probation, with special conditions that included payment of fines
and completion of drug treatment. Over the next two years, Mr.
Jones had had more than one "dirty" urine; however, the court
never revoked or extended his probation. Therefore, Mr. Jones's
probation expired on April 1, 2005. Nevertheless, docket entries
from April 1, 2005, through January 1, 2006, continued to address
Mr. Jones's compliance (or noncompliance) with the terms of his
probation.
On August 23, 2005, the court stated that, although his
"probation ha[d] expired," Mr. Jones must "remain in drug court
6 La. C. Cr. P. § 899(E).
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program until successfully completed."7 A week later, Hurricane
Katrina made landfall. Like thousands of others, Mr. Jones
evacuated to Houston, Texas, where he remained until September
2006.
On January 12, 2006, New Orleans's criminal courthouse was still
closed. Thirteen state criminal judges shared two borrowed
courtrooms in the United States District Court for the Eastern
District of Louisiana. The Department of Probation and Parole had
only a skeleton crew. The collections office-which administered
the payment of fines-remained shuttered. Nevertheless, the
district court issued a no-bond warrant for Mr. Jones's arrest. Why?
Because he had failed to pay his fines or appear for drug court.8
In September of 2006, Mr. Jones returned to his bedraggled city.
Days later, the Sheriff arrested Mr. Jones on the warrant for
probation violation. As noted above, the Sheriff did not file a return
on the warrant or otherwise notify the district court that Mr. Jones
was in custody. Instead, Mr. Jones was transferred to the Angola
State Penitentiary and then to the Winn Correctional Center in
Western Louisiana. It would be nearly four months before anyone
"discovered" Mr. Jones.
With the help of Brian Privor, a lawyer volunteering in post-
Katrina reform, the Tulane Criminal Law Clinic obtained Mr.
Jones's release. That ended KGIP's official involvement with Mr.
Jones. It began my interest in defenders and data.
IV. USING MR. JONES'S CASE TO EXPLORE A DATA-BASED SYSTEMS
APPROACH TO PUBLIC DEFENDER SERVICES
On the surface, Mr. Jones's illegal incarceration appeared to be
the result of a unique series of errors. However, I wanted to know
more. Even in the chaos of post-Katrina New Orleans, there must
have been something that someone-anyone-could have done to
avoid or mitigate Mr. Jones's tragedy.
I quickly lost interest in trying to catalogue the public defender's
mistakes and the judge's errors. OPD bore no resemblance to the
old OIDB office and Mr. Jones's attorney no longer worked for OPD.
The judge, who was stubbornly unapologetic, had been elected by a
large majority and had five more years on the bench before he
7 Records on file with author or available at Orleans Parish Sheriffs Office. (n.d.).
Retrieved April 15, 2015, from http://www.opcso.org.
8 Records on file with author or available at Orleans Parish Sheriffs Office. (n.d.).
Retrieved April 15, 2015, from http://www.opcso.org.
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would face another election. So, I abandoned an investigation into
individual errors and began, instead, to explore the multiple
systemic errors and oversights that contributed to Mr. Jones's
illegal incarceration. Nearly ten years later, I see this decision
more clearly: I had abandoned the operator approach in favor of the
systems approach to error.
A. A Systems Approach to Public Defense Practice
As I explain below, a systems approach to defender practice and
the collection and analysis of defender data might have prevented or
mitigated Mr. Jones's prolonged incarceration.
In an earlier article, I argued that a data-driven systems
approach to public defender practice should investigate catastrophic
and adverse outcomes (as well as near misses and unexpected
successes). 9 A catastrophic outcome is one that is adverse to the
client's interest and either factually erroneous or contrary to well-
established law. An adverse outcome is one that compares
unfavorably, and to the client's detriment, with the baseline or
normative outcome for similarly situated defendants.
Leo Jones's case had a catastrophic outcome. For nearly four
months, the State illegally imprisoned Mr. Jones in a remote
correctional facility, nearly 250 miles from his New Orleans home.
Mr. Jones's imprisonment was factually erroneous; it was based
upon an alleged violation of an expired (i.e., nonexistent) term of
probation. Mr. Jones's imprisonment was also contrary to well-
established law; the district court lacked jurisdiction to issue a
warrant for his arrest.
However, this study of Mr. Jones's case is unusual among the
studies of other catastrophic criminal justice outcomes. In general,
the criminal justice community uses the systems approach to study
the catastrophic outcome of wrongful convictions.10 Since wrongful
convictions are universally abhorred, stakeholders in an otherwise
adversary system can come together to investigate their causes.
However, wrongful conviction reviews offer only limited insight into
9 Metzger, P. R., & Ferguson, A. G. (forthcoming 2015). Defending data. Southern
California Law Review, 88.
10 See, e.g., Garrett, B. L. (2008). Judging innocence. Columbia Law Review, 108, 55-142;
Garrett, B. L. (2011). Convicting the innocent: Where criminal prosecutions go wrong. Boston,
MA: Harvard University Press; Gould, J. B., Carrano, J., Leo, R., & Young, J. (2012).
Predicting erroneous convictions: A social science approach to miscarriages of justice.




the wide range of public defender practice.
First, wrongful conviction reviews are disproportionately devoted
to the trials of serious felony and capital cases. As a result, these
reviews offer little insight about the frequency of catastrophic or
adverse outcomes in less serious cases, and even less insight about
the causes of the outcomes.
Second, the criminal justice system is slow to recognize wrongful
convictions. Often they remain undiscovered for decades. With the
passage of time, the systems approach becomes less useful as a
means of improving daily practice. The lawyers involved in the case
no longer practice; the laws applied to the case have been repealed.
Memories fade, evidence vanishes. Trends emerge-such as the
prevalence of cross-racial identifications in wrongful convictions.
But daily practice rarely improves.
Third, wrongful conviction reviews depend heavily upon a
collaborative "'360-degree' assessment of contributing causal
factors. However, other than in the context of wrongful convictions,
public defenders can rarely collaborate with other criminal justice
stakeholders in exploring public defender outcomes. Confidentiality
and attorney-client privilege sharply constrain public defenders'
ability to share information. An interest in maintaining
prosecutorial privilege and preserving convictions sharply
constrains law enforcement's interest in sharing information.
Nevertheless, a wide range of external causal factors contributes to
public defender outcomes; many of those factors are beyond public
defenders' knowledge or control. Unlike wrongful conviction
reviews, a systems approach to public defender outcomes must
adapt to conflicting interests and find a way to investigate outcomes
without full disclosure by criminal justice stakeholders.
Fourth, most criminal justice stakeholders evaluate case
outcomes with reference to broad social goals, such as public safety,
accuracy, and efficiency. However, a systems approach to public
defender practice must evaluate case outcomes with reference to
client interests. A good outcome is any outcome that benefits the
client. Every acquittal is a victory, even if the acquitted client is
guilty. However, the vast majority of criminal cases are resolved by
plea bargains. In those cases, it is far more difficult to distinguish
victory from defeat. How "good" is any particular plea bargain?
How "bad" is any particular sentence? Removed from the wrongful
conviction context, a systems approach to criminal defense demands
a nuanced, case-specific evaluation of outcomes.
Finally, defenders face a perpetual information deficit. As in Mr.
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Jones's case, defenders are often the last to know about criminal
justice errors or omissions. "In the data-less world of overworked
and under-resourced defenders, defendants may experience-and
defenders may not notice-more "routine" catastrophes, such as
illegal sentences or detention beyond the mandatory release date.""
Defenders do not know what they do not know. Without the
collection and analysis of data about ordinary criminal cases,
defenders will never know what systems and institutions require
refinement and repair.
Mr. Jones's case had a catastrophic outcome: an undetected,
illegal detention that persisted for months. And, Mr. Jones's case
was uniquely ripe for analysis under a systems approach. Mr.
Jones's catastrophic outcome was discovered within months-not
years-of its occurrence. Individual stakeholders would have fresh
memories and perspectives that might add to our investigation of
current criminal justice practices and procedures that contributed
to Mr. Jones's incarceration. And, because Mr. Jones's case
involved procedural and systemic operational errors, it would offer
insights about the functioning of the criminal justice system.
B. Understanding the Causal Factors that Contributed to Mr.
Jones's Catastrophic Outcome
Alarmed by Mr. Jones's case, we conducted two parallel inquiries.
One KGIP team doubled back through Orleans Parish inmate lists
to review the cases of all persons detained on probation violations.
Another team conducted a close review of Mr. Jones's case.
Together, the results of those investigations yielded a surprising
insight. Our moral outrage had focused us on the illegality of the
court's conduct and the incompetence in the OIDB attorney's
representation. Our systemic investigation revealed that a cascade
of individual and systemic errors and omissions contributed to Mr.
Jones's illegal imprisonment.
C. Examining the Larger Data Pool
Our data review indicated that, post-Katrina, there had been
dozens of illegal delays in processing of probation violation cases.
These delays occurred in all sections of court and in all types of
cases. We did not discover any other detainee whose probation had
11 Metzger, P. R., & Ferguson, A. G. (forthcoming 2015). Defending data. Southern
California Law Review, 88.
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already expired at the time of arrest. However, one detainee's term
of probation had expired during his prolonged prehearing detention.
Many other probation detainees had been incarcerated for weeks, or
even months, without the knowledge of anyone in the court system.
Each of these probation violation cases represented a catastrophic
procedural error: an untimely hearing in clear violation of well-
established law. However, since each case was-or would
eventually be-resolved on its particular facts, we were unable to
assess whether the procedural delay negatively impacted individual
case outcomes (for example, by unnecessarily prolonging someone's
incarceration). Later, resource constraints prevented us from
retrospectively tracking case outcomes to assess the impact of the
procedural error.
Nevertheless, we did interview OPD lawyers about their post-
Katrina experiences with probation violation cases. The attorney
interviews demonstrated that many public defenders were aware
that the court system was not timely processing probation violation
cases. Several of them had handled probation violation cases
marked by lengthy delays between arrest and appearance.
Generally, those cases had come to the court's attention when the
defendant or the defendant's family contacted a probation officer or
court clerk. None of the OPD attorneys were aware of the pervasive
nature of these probation violation delays. Each attorney's
knowledge was limited to his or her personal representation of
individual clients.
When interviewed about these delayed probation violation cases,
defenders generally agreed that the delays violated their client's
procedural rights. However, the attorneys also believed that the
arrest-to-appearance delays had little, if any, substantive impact on
case outcomes. Attorney performance in those cases reflected this
assessment: many defenders did not raise the delays in court. 12
Others made procedural objections, but those objections did not
appear to produce demonstrable benefits in case outcomes.
As to the cause of the illegal detentions, we also spoke to
representatives of the probation department and the sheriffs' office.
Our investigation revealed a wholesale breakdown in the Sheriffs
protocol for notifying the court and the probation department about
probation arrests. This was the error common to all of the illegal
delays in probation violation cases.
12 The researchers did not attempt to determine whether this was because the defenders
had not noticed, or had noticed but ignored, the delays in processing probation cases.
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Armed with the inmate data, public defender administrators
alerted the sheriffs office, which promised to reform its practices.
The cooperative nature of the KGIP project meant that OPD did not
alert the press about the Sheriffs administrative failure. Instead,
the systemic error was addressed quickly, and cooperatively,
through informal communications.
D. Systems Analysis of Mr. Jones's Case and the Cases of Delay in
Probation Violation Hearings
The Sheriffs failure to notify the court and the probation
department about probation violation arrests was the most obvious
causal factor common to the delayed probation violation cases. To
explore other causal factors and develop potential safeguards
against future errors, we attempted to identify all causal factors,
either common to the group or unique to Mr. Jones. Based on that
list, we hoped to devise proactive solutions to this type of problem.
We broke the causes down into three categories: individual attorney
error, institutional factors at OPD, and systemic criminal justice
factors that were beyond OPD's control. Working in roughly
chronological order, we identified the following causal factors:
1. The Assigned Public Defender's Deficient Performance
Although Mr. Jones's assigned public defender appeared with him
several times after his April 1, 2005, probation expiration date, that
attorney never objected to the court's continued imposition of
probationary terms. Either the lawyer was unaware that Mr.
Jones's probation had expired, or he did not understand the legal
implications of the probation's expiration.
While we did not conduct a retrospective analysis of pre-Katrina
probation cases, this appeared to be a unique "operator" error that
was unlikely to recur in the post-Katrina public defender's office. In
2005, when the court "extended" Mr. Jones's expired probation, the
OIDB office was wildly understaffed and underresourced. By 2007,
Mr. Jones's OIDB attorney no longer worked for the public
defender's office. Indeed, almost the entire legal staff had been
hired after Katrina, as part of OPD's reform efforts.
Our survey of the OPD attorneys made us skeptical that a
misunderstanding about probation expiration was a mistake
common to the current public defender's office. Our interviews of
the current public defenders suggested that they fully understood
the implications of an expiration of probation. In contrast, we had
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no way to assess whether the misunderstanding exhibited by Mr.
Jones's judge and his probation officer was representative of a
widespread systemic misperception. However, since the public
defender's office understood the significance of the expiration of a
term of probation, it seemed that attorney advocacy could keep this
relatively unique problem in check. Accordingly, we did not
consider a focus on individual attorney error or specific judicial
conduct to be a meaningful avenue for preventative reform.
2. The Pervasive Underfunding of the Public Defender's Office
Prior to Hurricane Katrina, the public defender's office hired only
part-time attorneys. They, in turn, were assigned to work in
particular courtrooms, not to represent individual clients. Funded
almost entirely by traffic tickets, the public defender practice was
wildly under-resourced and highly dependent upon the judiciary,
leading to a system that was "court-based rather than client-
based."13  The public defender's office had only two desktop
computers and one ancient copy machine. There were "no client
files or any other records or data, save a monthly tabulation of cases
closed and how they were closed." 14 There was "no phone number
for the office, and clients [could] not come to the office."1 5 It is
impossible to separate these grotesque working conditions from the
individual attorney error in Mr. Jones's case.
On any given day, Mr. Jones's attorney had a caseload of more
than 300 open felony cases. His part-time public defender salary
provided neither health care nor retirement benefits. He had no
paralegal or social work support and shared the services of only two
investigators with more than twenty other attorneys. To blame Mr.
Jones's attorney would miss the forest for the trees. As an
institution, the public defender's office had operated within
conditions that doomed Mr. Jones's attorney to failure. And,
blaming the public defender's office would also overlook larger
causes. Funding inequities in the criminal justice system, and a
13 Chiarkis, N. L., Henry, D. A., & Stone, R. N. (2006). An assessment of the immediate and
longer-term needs of the New Orleans public defender system. Washington, DC: American
University, at 11.
14 Chiarkis, N. L., Henry, D. A., & Stone, R. N. (2006). An assessment of the immediate and
longer-term needs of the New Orleans public defender system. Washington, DC: American
University, at 12.
15 Chiarkis, N. L., Henry, D. A., & Stone, R. N. (2006). An assessment of the immediate and
longer-term needs of the New Orleans public defender system. Washington, DC: American
University, at 12.
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court-centered culture of representation, had doomed the public
defender's office to failure.
In 2006, reform of the state's system for funding indigent defense
was already underway. In that highly politicized endeavor, Mr.
Jones's case-and the cases of the other probationers-would, at
most, be a footnote in the larger discussion of the relationship
between funding and attorney performance.
3. Criminal Justice Stakeholders' Incorrect Belief that an Expired
Probation Could Be Continued Until Pending Satisfactory
Completion of the Probationary Terms
At a status conference on August 23, 2005, the district court
acknowledged that Mr. Jones's "probation ha[d] expired." 16
However, the court ordered Mr. Jones to remain on probation until
he successfully completed a drug court program." In January of
2006, the court compounded this error by issuing an arrest warrant
for Mr. Jones based on his post-Katrina failure to appear in court.
More than two years later, when KGIP sought Mr. Jones's
release, the court still insisted that it retained jurisdiction over Mr.
Jones. The Department of Probation and Parole concurred that,
notwithstanding the expiration of Mr. Jones's probation, the court
retained jurisdiction over him. Over counsel's objections, the court
put Mr. Jones's case on the calendar for a "probation status
hearing."" Subsequently, the court ordered the Sheriff to drug test
Mr. Jones. Then, the court remanded Mr. Jones to jail for a "dirty"
urine. The district court also ordered him to pay outstanding fines
and complete a drug treatment program.' 9 Only after the appellate
court granted an emergency writ did the district court "close" the
case and terminate Mr. Jones's probation "unsatisfactorily." 20
The incorrect belief that the expiration of a term of probation did
not end the court's jurisdiction over Mr. Jones was clearly a causal
factor in Mr. Jones's illegal incarceration. However, it was a factor
largely beyond the control of the public defender's' office. Since the
16 Records on file with author or available at Orleans Parish Sheriffs Office. (n.d.).
Retrieved April 15, 2015, from http://www.opcso.org.
17 Records on file with author or available at Orleans Parish Sheriffs Office. (n.d.).
Retrieved April 15, 2015, from http://www.opcso.org.
18 Records on file with author or available at Orleans Parish Sheriffs Office. (n.d.).
Retrieved April 15, 2015, from http://www.opcso.org.
19 Records on file with author or available at Orleans Parish Sheriffs Office. (n.d.).
Retrieved April 15, 2015, from http://www.opcso.org.
20 Records on file with author or available at Orleans Parish Sheriffs Office. (n.d.).
Retrieved April 15, 2015, from http://www.opcso.org.
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Tulane Law Clinic had litigated Mr. Jones's release, we were unable
to assess whether, and to what extent, the public defender's office
might have been successful in "retraining" the bench or the
probation office. Moreover, since the problem appeared to be
isolated, it was not appropriate for the public defender's office to
formally address the matter with the board of judges or the head of
probation.
4. The Sheriffs Failure to Report Probation Violation Arrests
Upon execution of a probation violation warrant, the Louisiana
Code of Criminal Procedure requires prompt arrest notification to
the court and the probation department. In Orleans Parish, the
sheriffs office handles this notification. After booking, the Sheriff
notifies the judge and the probation department of the probationer's
arrest. The probation officer then calendars the case for a probable
cause determination, which must occur with ten days of the
probationer's arrest. 21
No one ever filed a return on the warrant for Leo Jones's arrest.
As a result, neither the court nor the probation officer knew that
Mr. Jones was in custody. Since the criminal justice system had no
other notification process, no other criminal justice stakeholder
even knew of Mr. Jones's arrest.
Similar errors by the Sheriff caused illegal delay in the cases of
many other probation detainees. And, in each individual case, the
latent nature of the notice error precluded individual public
defenders from acting until the harm-untimely probation
determination-had already occurred. In this regard, the Sheriffs
notification failure was a systemic failure beyond OPD's control.
5. OPD's Institutional Failure to Track the Probation Expiration
Dates
Neither the pre- or post-Katrina public defender's office
calendared or tracked defendants' probation expiration dates.
There was no automated notification system that might have
alerted Mr. Jones's attorney to the expiration of his probation.
Similarly, no supervisory support system routinely reviewed
attorney case files for basic compliance with procedural rules.
We considered supervisory review to be an inefficient means of
21 La. C. Cr. P. § 899(E).
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error avoidance. In any case, a court might modify, revoke, or
extend a term of probation and it might do so several times. An
OPD supervisor would have to read through dozens of docket
entries in order to determine a defendant's probation expiration
date.
Accordingly, we turned our attention to the possibility of a
calendaring system that would "alert" the public defender's office to
probation expiration dates. We analogized such a system to the
routine maintenance alerts so prevalent in aviation. However, after
speaking with administrators in the public defender's office, we
concluded that such a calendaring system would not be successful.
It would depend heavily on reporting by overworked and
overwhelmed OPD attorneys. Individual attorneys would have to
document each extension or modification of probation. This
dependence upon ongoing, individual data reporting would increase
the possibilities of noncompliance and of erroneous inputs. Since
the illegal extension of Mr. Jones's probation seemed to be entirely
aberrant, we concluded that an automatic notification system would
demand too much work for too little return.
However, we also determined that OPD had an overlooked and
underutilized capacity to pool attorney knowledge about common
practices that were clear violations of statutory law. Because the
delays in probation violation hearings did not immediately appear
to affect case outcomes-either adversely or catastrophically-it is
not surprising that line defenders did not report these arrest-to-
appearance delays to OPD supervisors. There was no office culture
of error and risk investigation and, in the high-pressure practice of
public defense, delays in probation violation proceedings were a low
priority. As a result, the public defender's office had no
institutional awareness of the notification problem and, therefore,
no institutional appreciation of the risk that the notification
problem might cause or exacerbate a catastrophic error.
We advised that OPD develop an error reporting practice that
would collect and analyze instances of systemic basic noncompliance
with procedural rules.
V. LESSONS LEARNED ABOUT APPLYING THE SYSTEMS APPROACH TO
THE DELIVERY OF PUBLIC DEFENDER SERVICES
Using an individual or operator error approach to Mr. Jones's
situation would clearly have demonstrated serious errors by his
attorney. His attorney either failed to notice that Mr. Jones's
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probation had expired or believed that, notwithstanding the
expiration, the district court had jurisdiction over Mr. Jones.
However, pointing the finger at Mr. Jones's attorney would have
been an inadequate response to the error. The public defender's
office had changed; Mr. Jones's lawyer had moved on.
Had OPD required defenders to report black-letter system
failures, such as the probation violation notification delays, analysts
might have noticed the frequency of the delays in producing
probation violators and considered the risks inherent in the
underlying notification error. Instead, a culture of isolated and
individuated attorney practice helped conceal the Sheriffs repeated
latent error in probation violation cases.
OPD might also have tried to forecast the "worst-case scenario"
that might be associated with the notification delays. Or, OPD
might have concluded that this was a low-priority administrative
error that merited only an administrative response. Certainly, OPD
could not have predicted the unique complications of Mr. Jones's
case. However, OPD might have imagined a notification delay that
would result in a probationer being detained pending a hearing far
longer than the he would have been detained on the actual violation
sentence.
The office might also have considered what steps it could take to
reduce the risk of such errors. OPD might have asked the sheriffs
office for better notification. However, it might also have asked the
jail to produce a daily or weekly list of probation violators in custody
so that the office could review that list for notification failures.
OPD might also have determined that, for some defendants, the
notification delay was an unanticipated benefit. In that
jurisdiction, the sheriffs office did not routinely perform drug
screens on those arrested for probation violations. So, in some
cases, the notification delays might have benefited drug-using
arrestees who might otherwise have provided an incriminating
urine sample. OPD might, therefore, have made a reasonable risk-
reducing decision to review the notification delay cases for
catastrophic over-detention errors, but to make case-specific
determinations about when to demand prompter court appearances.
Instead, the scope and prevalence of the arrest-to-appearance
delay did not emerge until a large data-driven pro bono project
interviewed hundreds of detainees within a two-month period.
Absent such a data collection project, Mr. Jones might have spent
many more months of illegal incarceration. As Mr. Jones's case
demonstrates, the collection and analysis of public defender data is
1278 [Vol. 78.3
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essential to preventing the next defendant's illegal incarceration.

